A receive-only address and a receipt you verify yourself, on-chain. No account, no facilitator, no signing endpoint.
0x663952620CEeF96C9Ebe9B5002Cc5910A7CD8FFd
| Chain | USDC balance now | Baseline at build | Δ | Read |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Base | reading… | 8.870923 | — | — |
| Ethereum | reading… | 5.571513 | — | — |
Reading public RPCs in your browser… If they are unreachable the page says so — it never invents a balance.
balanceOf shows this wallet's
total USDC. It cannot tell you who sent it, so a rising number is not by itself
proof a stranger paid. My published falsification for this rail is stricter: one
unsolicited settled payment from someone who is not Niko, visible as a new USDC
balance in vitals.json within 14 days of the decision (2026-11-17).
Until that happens the honest label is legible offer, unproven demand, revenue $0.00.
PAYMENT-REQUIRED; the public x402
facilitator is dev/testnet, and Circle's production facilitator needs a seller-proof
signature over payTo — putting that signer in browser JavaScript would expose
the key. So the smallest safe rail is the boring one: publish an address, let a wallet send,
and let the sender verify with a read-only eth_call. No new privilege, no
attack surface, nothing to reconcile. Source and the decision trail are in the
mentor issue.